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*Senior Fellow, The Jerome Levy Economics Institute of Bard CollegeIts opponents may have defeated the Clinton administration’s health
care plan. But the problems it addressed have not gone away.’ In
many key respects, they have worsened. More Americans are without
health insurance. Fiscal retrenchment threatens the public programs
serving the old and the poor. And, while economies have been found
in managed care, health care spending has continued to increase more
rapidly than economic activity as a whole.
The rise of managed care itself has raised new concerns. It has
transformed American medicine into a battleground of dispute between
employer and employee, insurer and subscriber, doctor and patient -
no surprise considering its incentives to economize on care, even when
that means withholding care. Indeed, bonuses paid to physicians in
capitated HMO plans are little more than thinly disguised kickbacks to
do exactly that.
Economies from managed care are coming at a high price, depressing
the revenues of hospitals and thus undermining the uncompensated-
care cross subsidies that have acted as a safety net for the uninsured
poor. Buying medical services from a “preferred provider
organization” or PPO - a type of HMO structured to give subscribers
special reduced rates- is, by its very nature, a way of avoiding having
to pay for someone else’s medical care.2
Hobbled by excess capacity and the underlying shift in the past decade
from in-patient to out-patient care, hospitals have been ill-equipped to
counter the newfound assertiveness of health insurance plans and their
employer sponsors. They succeeded in developing profitable out-
patient treatment when Medicare and Medicaid shifted in the early
1980s from retrospective payments (which are based on actual costs)
to prospective payments (which are keyed to diagnoses upon
’ Henry J. Aaron, editor, “The Problem That Won’t Go Away, Reforming U.S. Health Care Financing,”
Brookings Institution, 1996.
2 Ibid., page 6.admission). Hospitals also were in a position to cope with the revenue
squeeze brought on by the new rules and with the resulting excess
capacity, as they then had the market power to pass on unreimbursed
costs to private payers.
Those options are now foreclosed. Indeed, with private payers driving
an even harder bargain than Medicare and Medicaid, private hospitals
are at risk of losing their role as agents of redistribution. Founded as
eleemosynary institutions, they are now confused as to what they are
and how they are to act.3 The comforting, even self-justifying, axiom,
“no margin, no mission,” is perilously close to becoming “mission, no
margin.” Proliferating mergers may well help many hospitals defend
themselves from the depression of fees, but they are unlikely to restore
the redistributive role hospitals played in American life in the past.
Insurance market failure
Other major trends in American health care are also at least as
troubling as they were a few years ago.
The cross subsidies from the healthy to the sick - they too a safety net
- have all but disappeared in the individual and small-group insurance
market. Those with a history of illness and in need of recourse to that
market are at risk of being screened out - or offered unaffordable, if
not pseudo, insurance made useless by the fine print. Techniques for
underwriting - the process of dividing the market into risk categories -
have become so aggressive that they are destroying the market for
health insurance for those not covered in a large-group plan at work or
by Medicare or Medicaid. Even large-group plans, which also have
become aggressive in screening for pre-existing conditions, offer less
protection that they once did.
The number of uninsured now exceeds 40 million. The breakdown of
the individual and small-group insurance market has taken a toll. But
3 Carl J. Schramm, commenting on a paper published in “American Health Policy, Critical Issues for
Reform,” Robert B. Helms, editor, The AEI Press, 1993.so have several other forces. Increasingly, large companies have opted
to out-source work that had been done in-house, shedding fringe
benefits which can run quite high as a share of total compensation for
low-paid workers. Increasingly also, employers who have continued to
offer health insurance as part of a compensation package have passed
on more of the cost to employees directly. The temptation to drop
coverage and become a “free rider” on the system in the event of a
major illness has risen accordingly, notably among the poorly paid
whose compensation has dropped in absolute as well as relative terms.
Strikingly, only 80% of Americans not covered under Medicare and
Medicaid have health insurance, down more than 10 percentage points
from the early 1980s. No different from many other aspects of
American life, health care reflects the growing impoverishment of those
at the bottom.
Medicare and Medicaid, to be sure, must figure prominently in the
broader fiscal retrenchment if the deficit is to come down significantly.
They account, after all, for 20% of the budget and for an even larger
28% of its growth in the past 10 years. But, just as in the trend to
managed care, economies in the public programs are coming at a high
price.
The partisan debate this past year over whether Medicaid should
remain a federal entitlement has obscured the more important point
that, under either the Clinton administration’s or the Republican
Congress’ plan, Medicaid will finance even less of the health care of
the poor than it does now. Even now, it finances care for only half of
the population below the federal poverty line.
Public hospitals are in no position to cope with the pending cuts in
Medicaid baseline budgets. Harder cases, but not the resources to treat
them, have been shunted their way by revenue-squeezed private
hospitals. What is more, public support has fallen because of the
resulting perception of inefficiency and ineptitude. Never well funded,
county and municipal hospitals have become even more financially
strapped as States and localities, like employers, have retreated from
earlier commitments.Medicare - historically more secure than Medicaid because of the
strength of its constituency - is also at risk as the post-World War II
baby boom generation ages. Projections for the trust funds - and for
the underlying imbalance between the beneficiary population and the
taxpaying workforce - point to both cutbacks in real services and
increases in tax rates. These will be all the larger the longer they are
put off.
All of this bodes ill for the health care of the growing number of
Americans that cannot afford to pay for their own care. And it bodes
ill for the nation as a whole. It promises to leave health care all the
more rationed by price - all the less a basic citizenship right as it is in
just about every other advanced country of the world. At the very
least, Americans will have more trouble than ever before squaring their
own view of themselves as a caring people with such a form of
rationing.
The financial stress hospitals face, moreover, will adversely affect the
health care of even high-income Americans who can afford the best
care. Teaching, research, and other public goods are also at risk.
Quality can be expected to slip, just as public services have in the
“high rent” districts of such cities as Washington, D.C. and Newark.
Those neighborhoods have not been immune from the broader forces
affecting the cities of which they are part.
Shift to a State focus
With the death of the Clinton administration’s plan, efforts to expand
access to health care have passed to State houses where reformers have
made some progress - piecemeal, however, and at a disappointingly
slow pace. Minnesota, Oregon, Washington, and Massachusetts all
have backtracked on fiscal grounds from plans to cover the uninsured
with “pay-or-play” mandates (which require employers to provide
health insurance or pay into a public plan) and Medicaid “buy-ins”
(which allow those not quite poor enough to be eligible for Medicaid toqualify by paying part of the cost). ERISA, which circumscribes State
power in the design of employee benefits, has also been a stumbling
block. Tennessee has enrolled the uninsured in State-subsidized
HMOs, although questions about quality at many of the participating
organizations remain. Hawaii has had a pay-or-play plan in force since
the 197Os, although it still does not cover dependents.
Progress at the State level has been slow for the two same fundamental
reasons the Clinton plan foundered: the practical political difficulty of
raising the revenue to cover the uninsured and the opposition of
employers and of small but powerful constituencies with little to gain
and much to lose from the cost control needed to make universal
coverage work. Questions of “who pays” and “who stands to gain and
who to lose” loom at the State as well as the federal level; they have
proved no easier to answer there.
Legislation on such insurance issues as portability - along the lines of
the Kennedy-Kassebaum bill approved in the Senate earlier this year -
is almost certain to be passed in the next year or so. Portability,
however, would provide access to health insurance to few Americans.
Even now, under a provision of the 1985 budget reconciliation act (or
COBRA), those who leave a job can take their health insurance with
them, albeit at their own expense and only for 18 months. Portability,
moreover, would not be costless. By facilitating access to health
insurance for relatively high-risk subscribers, it would raise average
premiums and thus would add to the problem of the uninsured on
affordability grounds.
Portability would do little, if anything, to remedy this basic flaw of
American health care. If that is to be addressed seriously, the nation
must rethink how health care is financed. In particular, hard questions
have to be raised about the reasonableness of subsidies coming now
through the tax exclusion of employment-based health insurance -
subsidies that now cost federal and State treasuries more than $80
billion annually.Tax exclusion of employment-based health insurance causes those who
can take advantage of it to make excessive claims on health care
resources. And it is thus one of the main reasons why American
medical care has become so costly, and, why, as a result, so many
other Americans lack health insurance. The question of who pays
becomes all the harder to answer politically when the bill is high. To
the extent medical care is subsidized, it ought to be subsidized on the
basis of real need. The nation would be greatly better off if that
principle were to govern in health care policy (including in Medicare)
as well as in every other aspect of public life.
This paper lays out the case for fundamental change in the way the
nation finances health care. The first section, a diagnosis if you will, is
a look at how the tax exclusion of employment-based health insurance
has driven LIP health care costs and, as a result, has made it more
difficult to get to universal coverage. The second, a prescription
section, outlines the structure of an income-based, universal,
system. The third section lays out the challenge of forging a
constituency around such a plan.
tax-credit
I. Dx: a financing scheme wrong from the start
Employment-based health insurance was an accident of history. It took
root in the 1930s when hospitals - hard hit by the Great Depression -
formed Blue Cross plans which secured their revenues by having
people effectively prepay their hospital bills. But not until World War
II, when Blue Cross came broadly into the workplace, did health
insurance cover ;L large part of the population. Facing wartime wage
controls, employers found health insurance - which was exempt from
those controls - an efficient as well as perfectly legal way of recruiting
skilled workers in unprecedentecily tight labor markets.
Further impetus to an employme~~t-based system came in the early
1950s when the IRS ruled that health insurance paid by employers was
not taxable to employees. The judgment was that it was hard to price
the benefits an individual employee received in a group plan, and thus
6hard to estimate the income on which tax would be due. Moreover, the
amounts at issue were relatively small - too small, in any case, to raise
broader fiscal issues. By the early 196Os, some 75% of the workforce
was protected by employment-based health insurance, as compared
with only 10% just before the war.
Two major groups were left out: the old and the unemployed, more
generally the poor who when they got medical care relied on the
charity of physicians as well as on cross subsidies coming through
hospital billing. With Medicare and Medicaid designed to fill that gap
in the mid-1960s, however, the nation was well on its way to
fashioning a universal health care system. That system, the perspective
was at the time, may have been different in design from the systems of
other industrial countries where universal care was financed almost
entirely by payroll or other taxes. But it was similar in function. The
theory was that an ever larger share of the workforce would be
protected by health insurance at the workplace, and that most others -
important among them the over-65 population which, unlike today, was
disproportionately poor in the 1960s - would have their medical care
financed by the new public programs.
The working poor: the vast majority of the uninsured
The vision of a universal health care system based on employment and
on entitlements for those without a job faded, however, as costs surged
in the 1970s and 1980s. Rapidly rising costs prompted for-profit
insurance companies to become adept at shunning potentially high-cost
subscribers, and at selecting “good” (i.e., low) risks. Even Blue Cross
was forced in many States by that competitive challenge to abandon the
community rating principle on which it was founded.
The high cost of underwriting, in turn, pushed premiums in the
individual and small-group insurance market to prohibitive levels,
prompting many in that market to drop coverage, the tax exclusion
notwithstanding in the case of small companies. Strikingly,
administrative costs in the individual and small-group insurance markettoday scale 40%. To be sure, the group-insurance model has remained
for large companies (98% of employers with 100 or more employees
offered health insurance in 1991, as compared with only 27% of
employers with fewer than 10 employees).4 But, through out-sourcing,
even large companies have retreated from earlier commitments.
Rising medical costs, moreover, caused State governments (which have
wide latitude in setting eligibility policies for Medicaid) to keep down
the number of people who qualify for Medicaid on income grounds,
and to restrict the services provided to those who do qualify. Many
States have followed a strategy of not raising the maximum income
levels for eligibility - a key reason why nationwide only about 50% of
Americans falling below officially measured poverty levels are enrolled
in Medicaid. Even so, with medical care costs rising rapidly over the
years, Medicaid accounted in 1994 for 17% of State and local
government budgets, up from 10% just ten years ago.
Not surprisingly, the uninsured population reflects these trends. It falls
broadly into three groups:’
l Those employed, which with their dependents account for about
75% of the total. They tend to be low-wage (many at or just above
the minimum wage) and employed at relatively small firms,
particularly in the services industries. Turnover is high (one of the
main reasons their employers cite for not offering health insurance).
But the more fundamental problem is that even a bare-bones
insurance package - priced at, say, $2,500 a year for a family -
would be as much as one-quarter of the total compensation of a
worker whose wage was at or just above the federal minimum.
With health insurance especially costly in the small-group insurance
market, the employer’s choice all too often is to forgo it. Many
employees would also forgo it (and take the equivalent cash income
instead) if, in fact, they had a choice.
4 Cynthia B. Sullivan, Marianne Miller, and Claudia C. Johnson, “Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance
in 1991,” Health Insurance Association of America, 1992.
5 Gail R. Wilensky, “Viable Stratcgics for Dealing with the Uninsured,” Health Affairs, Spring 1987.l The medically uninsurable, which account for no more than 2% of
the total. They cannot obtain insurance because of preexisting
conditions, even as employees of Fortune-500 companies. Many
States have formed high-risk insurance pools, which are highly
subsidized. But the appeal of the Kennedy-Kassebaum bill testifies
to a problem not yet solved at the State level.
l The nonworking indigent, which account for the remainder. These
are the long-term jobless and the chronically ill - many of them
deinstitutionalized mentally ill, substance abusers, or homeless.
They fit the Medicaid model -as it was conceived in the mid-1960s
in any case. Their incomes are above the increasingly low cutoff
levels set by their State governments, however.
The uninsured, it is true, have access to medical care. Much of it,
however, is in the late stages of illness and in such high-cost settings as
emergency rooms6 Limited access is reflected in unusually high in-
hospital mortality rates and in the need for hospitalization for illnesses
that usually are controlled, if not cured, by means of drugs and
physician office visits when the patients are insured. The uninsured are
twice as likely as the insured to be treated in a hospital setting for
diabetes, for example.
Americans have been willing to tolerate the rationing of medical care
by price on the belief that the rationing breaks down in the event of real
need.7 All too often, however, that is not the case. Typically the need
is recognized tragically late - when, for example, the leg has to be
amputated or the retina is ruined because of the effects of diabetes,
rather than when the disease might have been easily controlled.
Indeed, for rationing by price to endure, good myths about what
constitutes real need are essential to maintain.
6 Laurie Kaye Abraham, “Mama Might Be Better Off Dead, The Failure of Health Policy in Urban
America,” The University of Chicago Press, 1993.
7 Lawrence D. Brown, “The Medically  Uninsured: Problems, Policies, and Politics,” Journal of Health
Politics. Policv and Law, Summer 1990.Tax-free compensation in the guise of insurance
The high cost of American health care - and the associated problem of
affordability of health insurance - can be viewed as the inevitable by-
product of the method the nation stumbled on for financing health care.
Moral hazard - the tendency of insurance to increase the risk that is
insured against -is a threat to a well functioning insurance market
under the best of circumstances.8 But it is an especially large threat
when premiums can be paid out of pretax income. The added problem
with employment-based health insurance is that the consumer is hard to
identify. The customary producer-consumer relationship is muddled by
the quasi-consumer role of employers - that, too, the natural outcome
of the tax exclusion.
Because of the exclusion, employees have more health insurance (and
more income in the form of insurance) than they otherwise would. The
insurance, if at all comprehensive, buys two services. One is
protection against the financial consequences of a major unforeseen
illness, a reasonable use of insurance to spread risk. The other is
prepayment for routine and thoroughly predictable expenses that
otherwise would have to be paid out of after-tax income, an
unreasonable use of insurance redeemed only by the tax exclusion.
The prepayment is not insurance in any real sense, but a form of tax-
free compensation. The exclusion justifies the costs of using an
insurance model; those costs would never be justified otherwise, as
they are on top of the thoroughly predictable expenses that must be
borne in any case.
The arena in which moral hazard holds sway is thus quite broad -
extending even to such routine things as teeth-cleaning, treatment for
head colds, and the bandaging of scraped knees: all high-probability
but low-consequence events. Indeed, the exclusion pushed the health
insurance industry in the direction of increasingly comprehensive
benefits - and, then, as moral hazard would have confidently predicted,
overuse of those benefits as if “free.” This is hardly surprising. The
effect of the exclusion on the choice between two insurance plans, one
’ Mark A. Hall, “Reforming Private Health Insurance,” The AEI Press, 1994.
10comprehensive and the other less so, is to lower the cost difference
between the two by the marginal tax rate - some 30% to 40% for most
taxpayers if Social Security as well as income taxes are in the count.
Employers also benefit from the exclusion as it permits them to
leverage their compensation dollar. The gains accrue
disproportionately to large employers, however. Large employers are
not saddled with the administrative costs of the small-group insurance
market, and thus are in a much better position to leverage payroll costs.
Blunting market forces all the more
The problem with insurance from an economic or social point of view,
it should be acknowledged, is its virtue from the individual’s point of
view. Insurance allows sick people to make choices about pursuing
treatment with little, if any, regard for cost - no small gift at a time of
trouble. But insurance - especially if it is excessive as a by-product of
tax subsidies - reduces the incentive people otherwise would have to
seek out efficient providers of care, and to monitor the care they are
given. Market forces - which cannot work all that well in health care
in any case - become weaker still.
The effect of tax-favored medical insurance is to spur new types of
treatment that are better than the ones they replace, but also
considerably more costly. As long as the insured patient does not
confront out-of-pocket costs, the benefit-cost ratio of the new treatment
has to fall to zero to make that treatment uneconomic from his
perspective. Strikingly, the RAND Health Insurance Experiment,
conducted throughout the country in the 1970s and 198Os, concluded
that a $1,000 out-of-pocket deductible on a family plan reduced
expenditures in the range of 25% to 30% relative to a plan without a
deductible.g
’ Joseph P. Newhouse and The Insurance Expcrimcnt Group, “Lessons from the RAND Health Insurance
Experiment,” Harvard University Press, 1993.
11Moral hazard in employment-based health insurance and, as well, in
Medicare and Medicaid spurred costs all the more in concert with
retrospective payments. Reimbursement on the basis of actual costs
tended to lead to many advances in technology that would yield some
benefit but only at high cost. And it was an invitation to use those
advances intensively. R&D was influenced by expected utilization,
and the resulting technologies, in turn, expanded the demand for
insurance. “If, for example,” concluded one analysis of the interplay of
health care R&D and reimbursement, “decision makers in the R&D
sector believed that the development of a particular technology that
was costly yet effective would cause government (and subsequently
private payers) to expand insurance to cover it - as was done with
kidney dialysis - there (was) . . . an incentive to develop the product
even though it was not covered under existing insurance.“”
Top subsidies to top income
Apart from its effect on moral hazard, the exclusion violates canons of
tax equity. The tax benefits rise with the employee’s tax bracket, the
comprehensiveness of his insurance plan, and the share paid by the
employer. All three act against the principle of vertical tax equity to
make the subsidy especially generous to high-income employees - the
very people for whom insurance with high co-payments (a sure way to
limit moral hazard) is particularly appropriate. Illustrative of the lack
of vertical tax equity: The exclusion provides employees in the income
range of $100,000 to $200,000 per year an average tax subsidy in the
neighborhood of $2,000, as much as the average cost of health
insurance for families with $10,000 in wages.” Horizontal tax equity,
which calls for equal taxation of equal income, is also violated; 100%
of employer-paid health insurance is exempt from taxation, whereas
only 30% is exempt if the insurance is paid by a self-employed person
on his own behalf.
lo Burton A. Weisbrod, “The Health Cart Quadrilemma: An Essay on Technological Change, Insurance,
Quality of Care, and Cost Containment,” Journal of Economic Literature, June 1991.
l1 Congressional Budget Office, “The Tax Trcatmcnl of Employment-Based Health Insurance,” March
1994.
12Medical savings accounts suffer from the same deficiencies. And so
do so-called flexcomp accounts which permit employees to make co-
payments, and pay for noncovered health-related items like
prescription eye glasses and cosmetic surgery, out of pretax income.
Both tax wrinkles can be counted on to boost health care costs by
broadening the arena over which moral hazard holds sway. They both
also violate canons of tax equity, and, no different from any other “tax
expenditure,” require general tax rates to be higher than they otherwise
would be.
Finally, American medical care has become high-cost (relative to the
standards of the past as well as those of other industrial countries)
because of the nation’s reliance on medicine to deal with what, at
bottom, are broader problems. All too often, medicine rather than
social policy - by default rather than by design - has been the locus for
dealing with urban violence, teen-age pregnancy, and other symptoms
of the interplay of social disorder and poverty. And, all too often,
medicine has done a bad - as well as costly -job of it. The nation
ranks highest, for example, in infant mortality rates among developed
countries (and compares unfavorably even with many developing
countries). And, yet, standards in high-income States compare
favorably with the rest of the industrial world’s.12
Not a trade issue
The concern often voiced about the cost of American health care -
from business, in particular - is that the nation’s competitiveness
suffers as a result. That is far from the real issue, however. Because it
is in lieu of, not in addition to, wages and other benefits that otherwise
would be paid, health insurance is but one aspect of labor cost. In any
case, countries with whom the United States competes internationally
typically have significantly higher fringe benefits.
” Leroy L. Schwartz, M.D., “The Mcdicalization of Social Problems: America’s Special Health Care
Dilemma,” The AmHS Institute, 109.5.
13The real issue is alternative uses of resources - whether for education,
other investment, remedy for the nation’s social dysfunction, or any
other purpose. A rise in health care expenditures faster than in
expenditures as a whole “crowds out” those other expenditures - a
truism, to be sure, but one rarely given enough emphasis in discussion
as to why containing health care expenditures is important. Lower
expenditures for health care would not help the United States compete
more effectively in international trade; it would, however, make for
“better” use of national resources.
Too little, side by side with too much
Cost control, in particular, would provide scope for dealing with the
problem of the uninsured. At the very least, it would ease the resource
constraint that has been at the heart of the failure - by several of its
predecessors as well as by the Clinton administration - to achieve
universal coverage.
It is not that the 14% of the nation’s GDP dedicated to health care is
already “too high” in some absolute sense.13 That level would be hard
to quarrel with if it were the outcome of after-tax spending decisions.
The country, instead, has both too little and too much health care - the
natural outcome of spotty public programs for the poor and, at the
same time, widespread use of tax-free financing for most of the rest of
the population. Because of subsidization through the tax system, the
price of health insurance (and thus of the underlying medical care) has
become inflated, causing it to become unaffordable for all too many
people and, yet, effectively priced too low for most others. The
institutional structure that has priced so many out of the health
insurance market has made it difficult, if not prohibitive, to care for
them at public expense.14
I3 “Data View: National Health Expcnditurcs, 1994,” Health Care Financing Review, Spring 1996.
l4 Clark C. Havighurst, “Health Cart Choices; Private Contracts as Instruments of Health Reform,” The
AEI Press, 1995, pages 18-19.
14Legacies of the past
While promising for cost control in the long run, managed care will be
hard pressed to offset the forces that have caused American medical
care costs to soar and that have, in the process, blocked universal
coverage. It will be difficult, for example, to alter the practice patterns
of generations of comprehensive insurance coverage made logical only
by the tax exclusion, retrospective reimbursement, and fee-for-service
medicine. l5 Every incentive under that structure was to reduce risk in
the pursuit of a diagnosis and a course of treatment - and, drawing on
the virtue of insurance from the perspective of the individual, to do so
with little regard to cost.
The ability of HMOs to shadow-price traditional indemnity insurance
in many markets also suggests slow progress on cost-control. If that is
any indication of the competitive forces at work, it will be a long time
before real savings, rather than mere redistribution of the health care
dollar between practitioner and business owner, are effected. Whether
the savings of the HMO model derived from experience largely with
the youngest and healthiest groups of society can be extrapolated to the
population at large also remains to be seen.
In the meantime, the clash between what managed care plans (and their
employer sponsors) are willing to underwrite and the care the public
expects hospitals and doctors to provide on the basis of custom raises
new questions about the reasonableness of employment-based health
insurance. Historically, the pattern has been for employers to choose
the kind of medical plan their employees themselves would have opted
for - no surprise considering how health insurance has been used to
attract and hold skilled employees. Now, in contrast, as part of a
broader business strategy to control health care costs, many employees
have been virtually compelled to join HMOs. The resulting loss of
freedom undemlines whatever logic there might have been for
l5 George Bernard Shaw was among fee-for-service’s  sternest critics: “That any sane nation,” he wrote in
Preface on Doctors, “having observed that you could provide for the supply of bread by giving bakers a
pecuniary interest in baking for you, should go on to give a surgeon a pecuniary interest in cutting off your
leg is enough to make one despair of political humanity.” Quoted from Complete Plavs with Prefaces,
Dodd, Mead and Company, 1963, pngc 1.
15employment-based health insurance. And so does the fact that even
Fortune-500 companies - ATT itself - have moved away from the
concept of a career job.
II. Rx: use the tax exclusion to fund universal care
Both of these questions come on top of long-standing concern on the
part of economists that the tax exclusion is central to the interrelated
problems of the costliness of care and lack of access to care for a large
minority of Americans. All along, tax-subsidized employment-based
health care has made American medical care inordinately expensive
and, in the process, exclusionary. And now it is also dated, linked to a
model of the labor market that no longer reflects reality. These are
fundamental flaws, not remedied by portability and other essentially
small changes.
A reasonable alternative - one that holds out promise of controlling
costs as well as provides protection to the uninsured - is to require
people to have health insurance and to subsidize it as necessary. They
would obtain insurance as individuals rather than as employees. And
they would pay for it out of after-tax income, helped if needed by a tax
credit which could be financed by ending the tax exclusion.
Taxation of employment-based health insurance would not be all that
path-breaking. For the past several years, the imputed value of life-
insurance benefits in excess of $50,000, paid as part of an employee’s
overall compensation, have been subject to tax. And the original
justification for the exclusion - that the income is hard to identify in
group health insurance - is no longer valid. COBRA plans can be
valued; indeed, they must be for the former employee to get a fair bill.
And so can plans that offer employees a chance to choose among an
HMO and a low- or high-deductible indemnity plan.
An individual mandate and replacement of the exclusion with a credit
scaled to income are the key features of a plan put forth several years
ago by Mark Pauly and his associates - a plan designed to achieve
16universal coverage and, yet, build in incentives to contain costs.16
According to that plan, families with income at or near poverty levels
would qualify for a credit of 100% (to finance a basic, although
comprehensive, health plan); the credit would be reduced progressively
as income rises, reaching zero at, say, four or five times poverty levels.
A requirement that people carry health insurance may seem
burdensome. It is no more so, however, than the requirement that car
owners carry liability insurance because an uninsured driver represents
an unfair potential cost to everyone else on the road. A mandate is
needed to prevent people from self-insuring and effectively passing on
the cost of their medical care, when it become financially ruinous to
them personally, to society at large. And it is not all that onerous if it
is accompanied, as needed, by the financial resources to pay for it. A
mandate, moreover, is less of a constraint on freedom than it would
have been in an earlier age when employees had greater choice of
medical care than they have now in an age of the HMO.
Revenue neutrality
A health care reform plan that would gear tax subsidies to need - and,
at the same time, be revenue-neutral - would have to weigh a number
of trade-offs. Most important among them are (a) the size of the tax
credit that would apply at the lowest income levels (and, jointly with
that, the scope of the medical services to be covered under a basic
plan) and (b) how much subsidy is appropriate at other income levels.
It is clear, however, that ending the tax exclusion (especially if lost
State tax proceeds were added in) would yield revenues adequate to
l6 Mark V. Pauly, Patricia Danzon, Paul J. Feldstein, and John Hoff, “Responsible National Health
Insurance,” American Enterprise Institute, 1993. The Heritage Foundation has put forth a similar plan
(“A policy maker’s guide to the health cart crisis,” Stuart M. Butler, 1992). It differs most importantly
from the Pauly plan in having the tax credit open-ended, keyed to the actual health care spending of an
individual or a family, instead of capped at a specific dollar figure. The Heritage plan was incorporated in
the Nickle-Stearns bill considered in the 1993 Congressional session, and it formed the basis for the
health care proposals put forth by President Bush in the 1992 presidential campaign. C. Eugene Steuerle
of The Urban Institute is yet another leading advocate for replacing the tax exclusion with a credit (see
“The Search for Adaptable Health Policy through Finance-based Reform,” published in Helms, op. cit.,
pages 334-361).
17provide the needy uninsured with comprehensive, even if basic,
coverage - plus offer some subsidization well into the middle-income
range.
There would be ample scope for both in the $74 billion of forgone
federal income and payroll taxes the exclusion represented in 1994,
plus the $5 billion of revenue lost that year to State treasuries. The
budgetary resources to fund a tax credit could also count on the $11
billion per year Medicaid disburses to hospitals in “disproportionate
share funds” to assist them in the payment of uncompensated care -
plus matching funds and other similar support from State treasuries.17
With universal coverage, such assistance would no longer be
necessary.
Fashioning the basic plan
However complex the trade-offs, the principles of retargeting the
subsidies - and, as well, the mechanics of it - are straightforward.
As with any redistribution of income, the political process would have
to find a way to balance the interests of the beneficiaries against those
of the payers (indeed, every public service as well as every benefit
program must strike such a balance). The credit would have to be high
enough to provide genuine coverage (the diabetes would have to be
treated at onset) - and, yet, not so high as to underwrite the kind of
medical care that most unsubsidized consumers would forgo for
themselves, especially if they had to pay for it with after-tax dollars.
Extending health insurance to all would not mean provision of all the
health care that is technically feasible to provide. But it would mean
that all would be covered with a minimum level of adequate, if basic,
care. No one, however, would be constrained from buying insurance
that provided a deeper set of services, although all such insurance
would have to be paid for with after-tax dollars.
l7 Telephone convcrsalion  with John Shcils, The Lcwin Group, June 12, 1996.
18One  option  for the basic  plan  would  be to go with  any  relatively  low- 
cost plan  that  had  already  captured  a sizable  market  share.  The  dollar 
amount  of the full  credit  would  vary,  however,  with  the age of the 
subscriber,  family  size,  region  of the country,  and perhaps  a few  other 
broad  categories  -  only  a few,  however,  in order  to push  the insurance 
market  away  from  risk-rating. 
Another  approach  would  be to draw  on the experience  of Oregon, 
Washington,  and other  States  that  have  given  serious  thought  to the 
kind  of services  government  ought  to make  available  when  State  funds 
are used  in paying  medical  bills.  While  fiscal  squeeze  in those  States 
has  blocked  efforts  at universal  coverage,  the groundwork  for the 
nature  and  scope  of public  support  for medical  care has  been  carefully 
prepared.  Similarly,  existing  Medicaid  coverage  could  be the basis  for 
the federal  design  of a basic  plan. 
The  federal  government’s  role  would  be to ensure  that plans  funded  by 
the tax credit  had  met  minimal  standards  of protection  for subscribers. 
And  it would  also  be to channel  high-risk  subscribers  to insurance 
pools,  and to subsidize  the higher  cost  as necessary.  Significantly,  a 
standards  role  for the federal  government  would  preempt  State  laws 
mandating  inclusion  of specific  medical  services  in insurance  plans  - 
laws  that  have  been  important  among  the forces  raising  health  care 
costs  and that  also  have  worked  to the disadvantage  of employees  of 
small  firms.  As a practical  matter,  those  firms  cannot  avoid  State 
mandates  (and  also  State  taxes  on health  insurance)  by  self-insuring 
under  ERISA. 
Taxpayers  would  qualify  for a credit  against  their  income  tax for all or 
part  of the cost  of health  insurance  that  either  their  employers  had paid 
on their  behalf  or they  had paid  directly,  ending  at a stroke  the 
horizontal  as well  as the vertical  inequity  in the tax exclusion. 
Nontaxpayers  (most  of them  presumably  in the  lowest  income 
brackets)  would  have  designated  State  or local  government  agencies 
pay  the  credit  directly  to the  insurance  carriers. 
19 The  object  of the credit  would  be to fund  basic,  but comprehensive, 
health  care  that  families  could  not fund  for themselves  without  risk  of 
catastrophic  financial  loss.  This  means  that  no deductibles  or other  co- 
payments  would  be required  at relatively  low income  levels;  the credit 
in that  case  would  be adequate  to cover  the full  cost  of the basic  plan. 
As income  rises,  the credit  would  fall  below  the cost  of the plan;  the 
insured  would  pay  the rest of whatever  health  insurance  they  obtain, 
plus  any  deductibles  and other  co-payments,  out of after-tax  income. 
As income  further  rises,  the  credit  would  fall to zero;  all of the  cost  of 
health  insurance,  plus  co-payments,  would  come  from  after-tax  income. 
The  Congressional  Budget  Office  has designed  an illustrative  tax credit 
that  would  replace  the  1994 tax exclusion  in a revenue-neutral  way.  In 
its calculations,  the credit  would  equal  100%  of premiums  of $1,775 
for  single  returns,  $4,425  for joint  returns,  and $3,750  for head-of- 
household  returns  for those  with  incomes  below  the threshold  for filing 
income  taxes.  It would  be phased  out for incomes  between  one  and 
three  times  the threshold:  $6,250  to $18,750  for single  returns,  $16,150 
to $48,450  for joint  returns,  and $12,950  to $38,850  for head-of- 
household  returns.”  A family  with  adjusted  gross  income  of, for 
example,  $25,000  in  1994 would  qualify  for a 73%  credit  on premiums 
up to $4,425.‘” 
Providing  proof  of coverage 
Not  only  would  the amount  of the credit  vary  with  income,  so also 
would  the required  health  insurance.  All that  would  be required  is 
a family  have  enough  insurance  to meet  unforeseen  medical  bills 
without  stretching  its financial  resources  unduly  -  in effect,  have 
“catastrophic”  coverage.  Alternatively,  people  at all income  levels 
that 
l8 One  criticism  of a credit  that  starts  high  and  ends  low  is that  it involves  high  progressive  taxation  over 
the  income  range  of  the  phase-out.  That  is true  enough.  But  that  is a problem  of every  means-tested 
program.  It is in  the  very  nature  of  subsidies  pinpointed  to need. 
lg Congressional  Budget  Office,  op.  cit.,  page  43. 
20 (including  those  well-heeled  enough  to self-insure)  would  be required 
to purchase  the basic  package.*O 
Evidence  of insurance  coverage  would  have  to be supplied  to the IRS, 
either  by  taxpayers  themselves  (employees  could  use  a W-4  form)  or 
by  the State  or local  agencies  acting  on behalf  of nontaxpayers. 
Taxpayers  failing  to provide  such  evidence  would  be enrolled  in a 
fallback  insurance  plan,  to be funded  by  surtaxes  levied  on those 
taxpayers.  The  federal  government  would  select  fallback  plans  by 
competitive  bidding  in each  geographic  market  area -  a way  not only 
of enforcing  universal  coverage  but also of goading  the health 
insurance  market  back  to the principle  of community  rating. 
Getting  to real  insurance 
Ending  the tax exclusion  and replacing  it with,  in effect,  an income- 
scaled  voucher  would  alter  the health  insurance  market  in a variety  of 
ways.  In so doing,  it would  have  major  implications  for health  care 
delivery. 
Without  the exclusion  to make  it reasonable  to use  insurance  premiums 
to pay  routine  and predictable  expenses,  and with  the tax credit  capped 
at the  cost  of the  basic  plan,  Americans  would  seek  out  less expensive 
insurance.  The  change  would  push  the health  insurance  market  toward 
catastrophic  coverage,  featured  by high  deductibles  and other  co- 
payments,  thus  saving  on the claims  processing  and other 
administrative  costs  now  associated  with  the use of insurance  for the 
payment  of routine  and predictable  expenses.  It thus  would  reduce 
moral  hazard  and,  in turn,  the pressure  on costs  ensuing  from  the 
illusion  that  medical  care  is somehow  free -  or, at the very  least,  not  to 
be valued  at its full  cost.  Individual,  high  co-payment,  policies  would 
”  The  principle  that  all  carry  health  insurance  designed  to rule  out  catastrophic  financial  loss  would 
theoretically  exempt  a Rockcfcllcr  or others  of virtually  unlimited  resources.  It would  not  be  necessary  for 
them  to be  insured  to prevent  them  from  becoming  free  riders  on  the  system.  It presumably  would  be 
necessary  as a matter  of  practical  politics,  however,  just  as  it is in  the  case  of  mandatory  automobile 
insurance. 
21 offer  a good  alternative  to an HMO  to employees  that  now  have  little, 
if any,  choice. 
With  such  a change,  health  insurance  would  come  to be viewed  not  as 
an entitlement  linked  to a job,  but as real  insurance  -  protection  against 
chance  but potentially  devastating  financial  consequences.  It would  be, 
in effect,  “last-dollar,”  not “first-dollar,”  coverage.  The  plan,  in short, 
would  go far beyond  budgetary  neutrality  to promise  real economies  in 
the use  of resources. 
The  ad hoc  subsidies  now  flowing  through  hospital  billing  -  but 
ultimately  paid  by  society  at large -  would  be made  explicit  and 
transparent.  And  there  would  be better  balance  between  routine  and 
emergency  care.  Just  as with  any  other  universal  plan,  the care  now 
given  to the uninsured  who  cannot  afford  to pay  for it would  be 
provided  earlier  and  in much  less costly  settings. 
A requirement  that  all be insured  would  remedy  the problem  of adverse 
selection,  which  along  with moral  hazard  is endemic  to insurance. 
Because  of adverse  selection,  low risks  tend  to self-insure,  thereby 
pushing  up costs  for those  left in the insurance  pool  (high  risks  tend  to 
over-insure,  with  similar  effect  on costs).  With  a mandate,  however, 
each  insurer  would  “expect  to get a random  slice  of all risks,  and  there 
is no need  to charge  a premium  higher  than  the average  expected  for a 
given  risk  class,”  write  Pauly  and his associates  in support  of their 
plan.2’ 
A mandate  thus  would  push  the health  insurance  market  in the  direction 
of renewable,  long-term,  contracts  -  the essence  of community  rating. 
When  insurance  is voluntary,  such  a model  is unstable.  But  it is not 
when  insurance  is universal.  A mandate,  of course,  would  not  make 
health  insurance  affordable  for the working  poor  (it would  have  to be 
attached  to a tax  credit  or other  subsidies).  But  it would  undo  the 
breakdown  of the individual  and small-group  insurance  market  that has 
prevented  others  from  obtaining  to affordable  coverage.  Indeed, 
universal  coverage  may  well  be essential  to a well functioning  health 
21  Pauly  et alia, op. cit., page  3 1. 
22 insurance  market.  Without  it, risk-rating  drives  out the sick,  making 
coverage  prohibitively  expensive  for them  to maintain  -  thus  defeating 
the whole  purpose  of insurance.  And,  without  universal  coverage, 
community  rating  drives  out the healthy,  as it raise  average  prices. 
Toward  a more  efficient  labor  market 
Severing  the  link  between  health  insurance  and a job  would  go far 
beyond  portability  in breaking  job-lock.  Today’s  financing  of health 
care  has produced  a form  of insurance  that  is basically  a term,  rather 
than  a renewable,  product.  It yields  security  only  as long  as the job 
itself  lasts.  It also  discriminates  against  the young,  the unskilled,  and 
others  with  relatively  high job  turnover. 
The  overall  efficiency  of the  labor  market  would  also  benefit  if large 
employers  were  to lose the advantage  they  now  have  vis-a-vis  small 
employers  in leveraging  compensation  costs.  Efficiency  also  would  be 
served  if the tax rates  of the salaried  and the self-employed  were  on the 
same  footing;  if the discrimination  that  keeps  people  out of a job 
because  their  potential  employer’s  health  care  costs  might  soar  were 
ended;  and  if decisions  to retire  before  age 65 when  Medicare  becomes 
applicable  were  not  affected  by health  insurance  considerations. 
A key  question  is whether  employers  would  continue  to play  a major 
role  in health  insurance  if they  no longer  were  able  to leverage  labor 
costs  by  means  of the tax exclusion.  They  would  have  less  incentive  to 
act asmere  sponsors  of insurance  plans:  evaluating  plans  on behalf  of 
their  employees,  collecting  premiums,  and otherwise  overseeing  the 
functioning  of the plans.  Even  so, incentives  would  remain. 
Employers,  especially  those  of any  size,  are uniquely  qualified  to 
process  information  about  insurance  contracts  on behalf  of their 
employees.  Group  health  insurance,  moreover,  even  if taxable  to the 
employee,  is apt to continue  to be significantly  cheaper  than  individual 
insurance.  And  employers  are naturals  at pooling  risk,  and  thus  at 
fostering  community  rating  in the insurance  market  -  perhaps  the only 
real virtue  of an employment-based  system.  Employers  as well  as 
23 employees  would  benefit  on all three  counts  from  continued  employer 
sponsorship  of health  plans  (just  as they  both  do in the case  of taxable 
life insurance). 
Alternatively,  unions,  trade  and professional  associations,  and other 
nonprofit  organizations  -  or government  itself -  would  have  to assume 
an even  larger  sponsorship  role.  Or new  sponsors  would  have  to 
emerge:  churches,  civic  organizations,  and other  community  groups 
which  can naturally  pool  risk.22  Indeed,  such  sponsors  would  have  to 
undertake  the  role  corporate  benefits  officers  now  play  if, in fact, 
business  were  to retreat  from  sponsorship  of health  insurance  with  the 
end  of the tax exclusion. 
Cost  savings:  two  views 
How  health  care  expenditures  would  be affected  by  replacing  the tax 
exclusion  with  a credit  is hard  to prejudge.  Even  so, the RAND 
experiment  suggests  that  the resulting  trend  to higher  co-payments 
would  give  rise  to significant  economies.  Those  could  well  offset 
much,  if not  all, of the additional  cost  of going  to a universal  system, 
especially  since  universality  itself  would  yield  economies  in the early 
detection  and  treatment  of disease.  One  study  of the effect  of ending 
the exclusion  found  savings  as high  as one-third  of the medical  care 
spending  that  is driven  by employment-based  insurance.23  While  other 
such  studies  have  been  less optimistic,  they  nevertheless  have  found 
savings  in the  range  of  10% to 20%  for private  sector  health  care 
expenditures,  about  half  of that  range  for the  system  as a whole.24  The 
savings  would  be even  larger  if viewed  in the broader  context  of a 
more  efficient  labor  market. 
Increased  oversight  by consumers  of the costs  of their  medical  care, 
other  claims,  would  do  little  to curb  costs  because  these  are  so 
”  Conversation  with  Robcrl  E.  Moffit  of The  Heritage  Foundation,  February  23,  1996. 
23 Charles  E.  Phelps,  “The  Intcrrclatcd  Markets  for  Medical  Care  and  Health  Insurance,”  draft,  February 
17,  1996. 
24 These  are  cited  in  Sherry  Glicd,  “Revising  the  Tax  Treatment  of  Employer-provided  Health  Insurance,” 
The  AEI  Press,  1994,  pages  1.5 and  34. 
24 dominated  by  life-and-death  considerations.  The judgment  is that  high 
co-payments  would  have  minimal  effect  since  almost  one-third  of all of 
the nation’s  health  care  spending  goes  to only  1% of the population  in a 
given  year;  almost  three-quarters  of the spending,  to but  10%. 
These  percentages  underscore  the extent  to which  U.S.  health  care 
devotes  resources  to the difficult  cases,  often  at life’s  end.  But that  is 
hardly  a justification  for perpetuating  a tax system  whose  incentives  to 
overuse  of medical  care  for a large  majority  of the population  have 
been  wrong  from  the start.  A better  tax system  will  change  the benefit- 
cost  ratios  for  a wide  range  of medical  interventions.  And  it will  avoid 
the waste  of using  insurance  claims  to pay  for routine  care.  But  it 
cannot  be expected  to offer  guidance  on the volume  of resources  to be 
dedicated  to a grossly  underweight  newborn  or to a 70-year  old in dire 
need  of a new  heart  or kidney.  No matter  how  sound  the tax treatment 
of medical  care  costs,  such  ethical  questions  -  which  go to the 
community’s  claim  on scarce  resources  as well as the individual’s  - 
will  remain.  Indeed,  those  questions  will  become  even  harder  to 
answer  in coming  years  as health  care  accounts  for an even  larger  share 
of GDP.  Even  taking  into account  the  slowing  in the growth  of health 
care  spending  in the past  several  years,  health  care  is projected  to 
consume  18% of GDP  by the year  2005  according  to official 
projections.25  And  the potential  is for even  steeper  rise  thereafter 
because  of the aging  of the postwar  baby  boom. 
Alternative  approaches 
Universality  could  be achieved  through  a variety  of other  means.  All 
of them,  however,  are flawed  in one way  or another. 
Pay-or-play,  the essential  feature  of the Clinton  administration’s  plan, 
is regressive  in its implicit  payroll  taxation  of those  at the bottom  of the 
income  distribution.  Since  health  insurance  is, in fact,  paid  by 
employees  and not by employers,  pay-or-play  effectively  compels  low- 
25  Sally T. Burner  and Daniel R. Waldo, “National  Health Expenditure  Projections,  1994-2005,”  Health 
Care Financing  Review,  Summer  1095. 
25 wage  employees  to dedicate  an inordinately  large  share  of their  income 
to health  care.  And  it perpetuates  the fiction  that  it is the employer  and 
not  the employee  who pays  the bill. 
Pay-or-play  also  invites  employers  to game  the system  -  encouraging 
them  to switch,  for example,  from  full-  to part-time  workers  who  as a 
practical  matter  would  not be covered.  The  incentive  also  is to “pay,” 
that  is, to call  on the subsidies  to small  firms  that  also  as a practical 
matter  have  been  a feature  of the public  plans  employers  can choose  to 
pay  into.  Such  an approach  is wide  of the mark  in viewing  the  size  of 
firm,  rather  than  the income  of the employee,  as the key  problem  of the 
uninsured.  Pay-or-play,  moreover,  further  institutionalizes 
employment-based  health  insurance  in a labor  market  increasingly  at 
odds  with  the permanence  needed  to make  such  a system  work  well  for 
much  of the  workforce.  It would  have  to be supplemented  with 
cumbersome  programs  to extend  health  insurance  to non-employees 
and part-time  workers. 
All-payer  systems  along  the  lines  of the Canadian  model  are said  to be 
administratively  simple,  and  thus  channel  more  of the health  care  dollar 
to actual  patient  care.  Much  of the cost  of public  monopoly  systems  is 
hidden,  however.  Controlling  moral  hazard  shows  up in the cost  of 
claims  administration  in the  U.S.  system,  but not in the Canadian  where 
it is buried  in the cost  of budgeting. 
Budget  constraints  at the  level  of the  local  Canadian  hospital  have 
frequently  spelled  inordinately  long delays  for surgical  procedures. 
And  wraps  on physician  fees  have  meant  several  short  visits  for 
patients  with  illnesses  more  efficiently  treated  at one go.  “The  rough 
empirical  evidence,”  writes  Patricia  Danzon,  “tends  to confirm  that 
overhead  costs  in Canada,  adjusted  to include  some  of the most 
significant  hidden  costs,  are indeed  higher  than  under  private  insurance 
in the United  States.  Although  there  may  be waste  in U.S. private 
insurance  markets  at present,  this  waste  is attributable  primarily  to tax 
and regulatory  factors  (such  as the tax exclusion)  and  is not  intrinsic  to 
private  health  insurance.“” 
x  Patricia  M. Danzon,  “The  Hidden COSLS  of Bud@-constrained  Health Insurance,”  published  in Helms, 
26 Even  on the premise  that  the Canadian  model  had the edge  on 
overhead,  it would  be hard  to replicate  in the United  States  (especially 
now  that  fee-for-service  medicine,  which  is essential  to the model,  is in 
decline).  Shifting  to the public  sector  the 8% of GDP  that  private 
health  care  represents  out of the total  of  14% is the biggest  problem  of 
all in a country  wary  of government  -  the key  reason  why  the Clinton 
administration,  however  much  it might  have  been  tempted  by  the 
Canadian  model,  rejected  it a priori. 
Medicaid  buy-ins  would  resurrect  Medicaid’s  original  design  for the 
inclusion  of all low-income  households  in medical  care plans  not unlike 
the general  population’s.  They  would  be scaled  to income,  which 
would  limit  their  budgetary  consequences.  Those  consequences 
nevertheless  would  be sizable,  given  the  low incomes  of most  of the 
uninsured.  Buy-ins,  moreover,  would  extend  a program  that 
increasingly  is identified  with  heavy-handed  regulation,  red tape,  and 
stigmatizing  of the poor.  And they  would  leave  employment-based 
health  insurance,  with  its growing  insecurity  for much  of the work 
force,  intact. 
Adding  in the  public  program 
These  considerations  point  to extending  health  insurance  tax credits  to 
the Medicaid  population,  rather  than  to enlarging  the program  itself. 
The  added  advantage  of that approach  is that  it would  eliminate  the 
disincentive  Medicaid  recipients  now  have  to find  a job  lest they  lose 
their  health  care  -  the  so-called  notch  problem.  That  will  have  to be 
addressed  if there  is to be a serious  national  effort  to move  people  off 
welfare  and  into  work.  A health  insurance  tax credit  for the  working 
poor  (they  would  be the main  beneficiaries)  is functionally  the same  as 
the earned  income  tax credit,  although  it would  be earmarked  for an 
expenditure  of broad  social  as well as individual  benefit. 
on  cit.,  page 280. 
27 Tax  credits  would  not,  it is true,  meet  the health  care  needs  of the 
deinstitutionalized  mentally  ill and other  “walking  wounded”  who 
make  up a sizable  minority  of the uninsured.  There  would  remain 
need  to develop  and  fund  walk-in  clinics  and otherwise  devote 
a 
resources  to “poverty  medicine.“27  The  United  States  would  do well  to 
take  a lesson  from  Japan  where  public  health  facilities  are widely  used 
for pre-natal  care,  immunizations,  and a few other  critical  interventions. 
Poverty  medicine  can do only  so much,  however.  The  issues  are far 
upstream  of even  the most  apt health  care  institutions.  They  will  have 
to be addressed  in a much  broader  framework. 
Medicare  also  could  be brought  into  a credit  arrangement.  And  it 
probably  ought  to be on the principle  that  subsidies  for health  care 
should  be based  on need  for the over-65  population  no less than  for the 
population  at large.  A heavily  subsidized  health  care  plan  that  is blind 
to income  for all over  age 65 may  have  made  sense  in the mid-l  960s. 
Health  care  was  6% of GDP;  the income  of the elderly  was 
significantly  below  that of the population  at large;  and  life expectancies 
were  distinctly  lower  than  they  are today.  But the approach  that  may 
have  been  reasonable  30 years  ago has never  been  seriously  re- 
examined  in the light  of vastly  changed  circumstances.  Subsidization, 
in fact,  has  become  even  deeper  over  the years  as beneficiaries  (even 
those  at high  income)  have  come  to pay  an even  smaller  share  of 
overall  Medicare  costs. 
It would  be unreasonable  -  indeed  unfair  -  to cut back  on the tax 
subsidies  to health  care provided  through  employment  for those  at 
relatively  high  income,  and yet  leave  alone  the subsidies  provided 
through  Medicare  for a similarly  well-heeled  population.  Lamentably, 
however,  the  Medicare  debate  has  been  focused  on fiscal  aggregates, 
rather  than  on the  level  of subsidy  that  beneficiaries  ought  to receive. 
In practice,  that  approach  means  top-down  budgeting  and continued 
squeezing  of the  incomes  of hospitals  and physicians  -  at the risk  of 
loss of quality  which  would  harm  not only  Medicare  beneficiaries  but 
the population  at large.  Lack  of focus  on income-appropriate  levels  of 
*’  David  Hilfiker,  M.D.,  “Not  All  of  Us  Arc  Saints,  A  Doctor’s  Journey  with  the  Poor,”  Hill  and  Wang, 
1994. 
28 subsidy  also means  a rise in premiums  for all beneficiaries,  including 
those  at low income,  which  would  be highly  regressive. 
The  underlying  premise  of the debate  has  been  that  “cuts”  from 
baseline  budgets  should  affect  beneficiaries  evenly  rather  than  be 
targeted  to groups  less  in need  of subsidization  than  others.  Too  little 
consideration  has  been  given,  for example,  to linking  premiums  to 
ability  to pay  -  something  that  would  offset  some  of the fiscal  squeeze 
in the offing.  For example,  Part B premiums,  which  cover  physician 
bills,  could  be raised  substantially  for relatively  high-income 
beneficiaries  without  even  reaching  the 50%  share  of the cost  of Part  B 
those  premiums  were  supposed  to finance  when  Medicare  was 
established  first. 
Broader  reform  might  well  include  integration  of Part A (which  covers 
hospitalization  expenses  and is fully  funded  by payroll  taxes)  and  Part 
B (which  today  is 75%  funded  by general  revenue,  25%  by beneficiary 
premiums).  Indeed,  there  is little,  if any,  reason  to distinguish  between 
Parts  A and  B, or to finance  them  from  different  sources.  The  rationale 
all along  has  been  that  Part  B is voluntary.  But,  with participation  in 
Part  B effectively  100%  because  the program  is so highly  subsidized, 
the distinction  is meaningless.  To the extent  there  is a public  interest  in 
subsidizing  medical  care  for the elderly,  that  interest  extends  across  the 
whole  range  of covered  medical  services.28 
Integrating  the two  Medicare  programs  -  especially  the financing  of 
them  -  would  provide  an opportunity  to take  a step  in the direction  of 
the principle  of ability  to pay,  paralleling  the design  of tax credit.  And 
it also  would  be occasion  to move  to a voucher  or premium-support 
system,  that  too paralleling  the design  of the tax credit.  The premiums 
of a combined  program  could  be keyed  to the incomes  of beneficiaries. 
And,  depending  again  on income  level,  vouchers  could  be considered 
partly  or wholly  taxable  income. 
28  Henry  J. Aaron  and Robert  D. Reischaucr,  “ The  Mcdicarc  Reform  Debate:  What  Is the  Next  Step?” 
The Brooking  Review,  Winter  1995. 
29 Integrating  the public  programs  into a tax credit  plan  -  or at least 
putting  them  on comparable  footing  on the principle  of ability  to pay  - 
would  also  give  the nation  an effective  mechanism  for governing  the 
volume  of subsidies  to health  care.  That,  in turn,  would  act as a 
needed  brake  on the  share  of GDP  dedicated  to health  care  on the eve 
of the  aging  of the postwar  baby  boom. 
III.  On to the  next  round 
Prospects  for significant  refomr  of American  institutions  are rarely 
especially  bright.  But there  are times  when  real change  seems 
possible,  as it did for health  care  as the Clinton  administration  took 
office.  It then  seemed  possible  to marshal  political  support  for 
universal  coverage  if that  could  be linked  to “middle-class”  concern 
about  the growing  insecurity  of employment-based  health  insurance. 
The  anxieties  and  uncertainties  the plan  itself  gave  rise  to no doubt 
contributed  to its rejection  in the Congress.  The  inclusionary  strategy  - 
with  its provision,  for example,  for  long-term  care,  drug  costs,  and 
early-retiree  insurance  -  drove  up the plan’s  potential  costs.  And  that, 
in turn,  led to concern  that promised  savings  in health  care  delivery 
would  not materialize  at all early  enough  to pay  for such  a strategy. 
Harry  and Louise  (acting  on behalf  of traditional  indemnity  insurers 
who  were  fearful  of the plan’s  emphasis  on managed  care  and 
community  rating)  also  did damage.  The  media,  unable  to make  sense 
out of inevitably  complex  issues,  failed  to provide  much  of a foil  to the 
myths  and distortions  the image  makers  succeeded  in getting  across. 
Ultimately,  however,  it was the Clinton  administration’s  Republican 
adversaries  that  brought  down  the plan.  They  were  adept  at labeling 
pay-or-play  as implicit  taxation,  and thus  at exploiting  the mistrust  of 
government.  Few  constituencies  were  ready  to do battle  for the plan, 
and had  at the  same  time  ample  resources  and the voice  to do so. 
Health  care  reform  of any  size and  scope  is thus  off the policy  agenda 
for now.  Understandably,  Democrats  are reluctant  to embrace 
30 anything  beyond  such  minor  changes  as portability.  Republicans  are 
also  fearful,  however  -  particularly  of making  of Medicare  a “third 
rail”  political  issue  of the kind  Social  Security  retirement  has become 
over  the years.  They  must,  however,  push  for substantial  reductions  in 
Medicare  as well  as in Medicaid  baseline  budgets  if their  embrace  of 
deficit  reduction  at large  is to be at all credible. 
All the  same,  health  care  reform  is apt to resurface  as a major  national 
issue  in the next  few  years.  The  growing  ranks  of the uninsured,  the 
cost  consequences  of misdirected  subsidies,  the breakdown  of the 
individual  and small-group  insurance  market:  None  of these  will have 
gone  away.  Nor  will  the clash  in the workplace  arising  out of growing 
restriction  on the kind  of insurance  plan  employees  may  choose. 
Appealing  beyond  the narrow  interest 
The  next  time  round,  replacing  the tax exclusion  with  a tax  credit  may 
well  get a serious  hearing.  It addresses  all of these  issues,  and 
promises  at the  same  time  to help  control  health  care  costs  through 
economical  choice  of insurance  plan. 
Building  a constituency  for  it will not  be easy.  The  idea  has not  been 
accepted  among  those  on the Right  who typically  have  viewed  it as a 
tax  increase  -  one that,  besides,  would  make  the federal  tax  system  at 
least  slightly  more  progressive  than  it is now.  Those  on the Left 
typically  have  been  opposed  on grounds  that health  care  benefits  were 
negotiated  in lieu  of wages.  It would  be unfair,  their  contention  is, to 
lessen  the value  of those  benefits  by making  them  taxable. 
A constituency  can  be fashioned,  however.  The point  to be stressed 
most  is that  individual-based  health  insurance  cuts  the increasingly 
tenuous  link  between  health  care  and employment.  It instead  ties  the 
health  care  security  of most  middle-income  Americans  to the  welfare  of 
the uninsured  poor,  and thus  makes  universal  care  not just  an act of 
benevolence  but one  of self-interest  as well.  Moreover,  those  that 
would  benefit  from  a credit,  net of a lost tax exclusion,  would  extend 
31 well  into  the middle-income  groups,  judging  by the calculations  of both 
CBO  and Pauly  and his associates.  Even  many  high-income  people, 
who  would  be net  losers  looking  narrowly  at their  tax returns,  would 
benefit  by  seeking  cost-efficient  health  insurance.  They  would  be able 
to pocket  100%  of the difference  in price  between  one plan  and 
another,  rather  than  100% minus  their  marginal  tax rates.  And,  like 
everyone  else,  they  would  profit  from  the control  of health  care  costs 
apt to come  about  from  the purchase  of cost-efficient  insurance. 
The  benefits  for relatively  high-income  Americans  would  have  to be 
seen  -  and  sold politically  -  in a broader  context,  however.  They 
would  have  to be found  in the virtues  of a universal  system:  an end  to 
cost-shifting  -  a hidden  tax  but a tax all the same  -  relief  from  the 
squeeze  on hospital  revenue  that threatens  the quality  of health  care  for 
even  those  of unlimited  means,  and  a clear  conscience  that people  in 
need  are cared  for,  in more  than  myth.  The  appeal  would  have  to be to 
the axiom  of Adam  Smith  that  people  are prosperous  in a prosperous 
society. 
Corporate  America  itself  could  well form  part  of a constituency  to 
move  to individual-based  health  insurance.  It has benefited  from  the 
tax exclusion.  But it is not well  served  by the damage  to morale  and  to 
employee  relations  generally  that  has come  about  because  of the need 
to control  health  care  costs  -  a need  itself  rooted  in the tax-free  way 
the nation  has financed  much  of its health  care.  Being  “the  heavy” 
when  an employee  feels  denied  needed  care  for himself  or a member  of 
his family  is not  a role  Corporate  America  could  possibly  want. 
Retaining  a sponsorship  role  would  foster  employee  welfare  and,  yet, 
end the hopelessly  schizophrenic  position  corporations  now  find 
themselves  in as administrators  of health  insurance. 
Much  the  same  constituency  could  be formed  around  a phase-in  of an 
income-scaled  tax credit,  funded  by  a gradual  reduction  of the tax 
exclusion  or a cap on the exclusion  above  the estimated  cost  of the 
basic  plan.  Phase-in  could  start,  for example,  by  including  all children 
-  an approach  that  would  appeal  both  to the  Right’s  concern  for 
“family  values”  and  the Left’s  concern  for care  of the poor. 
32 No health  reform  is apt to get very  far, however,  if it is framed  in the 
basically  dishonest  public  discourse  of today.  A tax credit  or any  other 
means  of financing  universal  health  care  involves  a redistribution  of 
income.  That  has  to be acknowledged  from  the start.  The  case  for  it 
can be made  on grounds  of efficiency  and tax fairness.  But  it would  be 
more  convincing  if the political  establishment  is willing  to make  the 
case  for health  care  as a basic  human  right  -  not  to be parceled  out  like 
Chevrolets  or other  goods  and  services  best  distributed  only  by  the 
laws  of the marketplace.  That  may  be a novel  approach  in the  context 
of a political  debate  that  rarely  seems  to rise  above  appeals  to narrow 
self-interest.  But it might  well fall on receptive  ears  if put  forth  in a 
forthright  way. 
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